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RESUMEN: Este document revela los efectos positivos o negativos del desempeño de los 
gobiernos anteriores, así como la interferencia de los gobiernos existentes en los resultados de las 
elecciones en la India colonial durante 1945-46; por un lado, arrojando luz sobre los impactos de los 
gobiernos en diferentes provincias. Las elecciones se han examinado con un enfoque retrospectivo; 
por otro lado, se ha estudiado el impacto de la interferencia official en los resultados electorales; 
utilizándose los datos recopilados a través de las técnicas históricas, el análisis de contenido del 
registro de archivos y la extracción de la evidencia. Se ha llegado a la conclusión que la retórica 
electoral se mantuvo llena de reclamos y culpa al desempeño de los gobiernos anteriores. 
PALABRAS CLAVES: colonialismo, elecciones, desempeño del gobierno, injerencia oficial, 
elección de los votantes. 
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ABSTRACT: This paper unearths positive or negative effects of the issues related with 
performance of past governments as well as the interference of the existent governments on the 
outcomes of elections in colonial India during 1945-46. On one hand, shedding light on the impacts 
of the governments in different provinces the elections have been surveyed with the spectacle of 
retrospective approach. On the other hand, the impact of official interference on election results has 
also been studied. Having used the data collected through the historical techniques, content analysis 
of archival record and extracting of the evidence, the conclusion has been drawn that the electoral 
rhetoric remained filled with the claims and blames on the performance of previous governments.  
KEY WORDS: colonialism, elections, government’s performance, official interference, voters’ 
choice. 
INTRODUCTION. 
The general elections in India were announced on 21 August 1945 and scheduled for winter 1945-
46. The elected Constituent Assembly would be tasked with framing a new constitution for British 
India (1, p389) with the prospects of local rule independent of the British.  
On September 19, the viceroy of India Lord Wavell, in his broadcast message from New Delhi 
declared that ‘to convene a Constitution-making body,’ the Government ‘must hold elections so that 
the will of the Indian electorate might be known’. He proposed that after elections the government 
would ‘hold discussions with representatives of those elected . . . to determine the form which the 
Constitution-making Body should take’ (2, p93).  
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Notwithstanding All India Congress’ dissention for early elections, these elections took on critical 
significance for all Indian political parties concerned to play a role in the negotiations leading to the 
British departure from India. They gave the parties hope to divert their energies from driving 
protests in the streets (3 p350) to the formation of Indian government. All India Muslim League 
responded to announcement of elections by declaring that these elections would be a referendum on 
Pakistan (1, p389). 
Retrospectively looking, in the elections of 1937 Congress had won 758 of some 1,500 seats in 
various provincial legislatures and formed governments in seven provinces, including Madras, 
Bombay, the Central Provinces, Bihar, and UP. (4, p196) The functioning of these Congress 
ministries evoked the dissention from Muslim League. Its leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah proclaimed 
the resignation of the Congress ministries in 1939 as a ‘day of deliverance’.  
World War II (1939-1945) prevailed over all developments in the globe as well as in India. On its 
end, the Labour Party in Britain won the British elections and Tories, the party of war-time British 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill was ousted from office (3, p349). 
Labour leader Clement Atlee, the new Prime Minister, being much more sympathetic towards 
Indian independence, (5, p16) decided for Indian elections. When elections approached Bengal was 
under Governor’s rule that continued from March 1945 to April 1946. Functions of Provincial 
Assembly had been halted by the Speaker Nausher Ali. Governor Casey remained in office up to 
February 1946. The new Governor George Burrows was sworn in on February 20. Since the 1937 
elections province had been under the control of Muslim dominated coalition ministry under A.K. 
FazlulHaq. In that coalition ministry Muslim League was the most significant partner. In NWFP, no 




In the absence of any single group, on 16 March 1937, Sir George Cunningham, the NWFP 
Governor, invited Sir. Abdul Qaiyum, leader of newly formed United Muslim Nationalist Party of 
elected Khans to form a ministry that was sworn in on 1 April 1937.On 3 September, just after five 
months this ministry was removed after successful no-confidence motion moved by Dr Khan Sahib, 
the leader of the Congress party in the Assembly. He was invited to form his own cabinet on 6 
September. This ministry resigned on 7 November 1939when Congress decided to resign in all 
provinces on the World War II issue.  
After four years of Governor’s rule, the Muslim League’s ministry led by Sardar Aurangzeb was 
installed in May 1943 that managed to stay for two years. Aurangzeb and his colleagues formally 
tendered their resignation on 16 March 1945 to avoid the humiliation of success of a no-confidence 
motion moved by Dr Khan Sahib who was once again sworn in as Chief Minister (6, pp4-5). He 
was in office during 1945-46 elections.  
At the time of 1945 elections Punjab was governed by the Ministry led by Unionist Party, a party of 
Punjabi Muslim landlords and Hindu agriculturist that succeeded in 1937 election. While Sir 
Sikandar Hayat Khan led the Unionist ministry, (7 p420) he had entered in an uneasy alliance with 
Muslim League. The death of Sikandar in late 1942ascended Malik Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana to 
the Punjab ministry. (8 p 258) Unionist Party, while governing Punjab, was major contestant to 
Muslim League in 1945. This paper highlights the impacts of these governments on the elections 
1945-46. The examination is to test the presumption that people are more concerned with policy 
outcomes than policy instruments.  
DEVELOPMENT.  
Materials and methods.  
Retrospective model of voting behavior considers the government performance as main factor of 
voting. It that people are more concerned with policy outcomes than policy instruments. The good 
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performance of previous government can attract the people to vote for the former ruling party in 
order to bring back the retrospective rule. Even the effects of the past policies of existing 
government can also motivate the voters to vote for the existing government for the continuity of its 
retrospective decisions. The steps of current government which might be called the interference in 
the elections do not fall in the definitions of retrospective model.   
Interference of present government does not fall in the fold of retrospective model. Cunningham (9) 
observed to Wavell about the reason of Congress victory in NWFP, ‘It has been said that if 
Congress had not been in office, very difficult for Congress to get a dozen Muslim seats, because of 
favour to people by giving them cloth, sugar etc’.Muhammad Shakeel Ahmad, Amanuallah Memon 
and Fazal Rabbi (6, p8) believe that this observation reflected the retrospective model of electoral 
politics because they think that in this model popularity of the current government is apparently 
important. On the contrary, it denotes the interference of current government. 
Discussion. 
Retrospective model was reflected in the opposition of Muslim League to Congress due to its anti-
Muslim League steps during its ministries from 1937 to 1939 (10, p202). 
Muslims concluded that the Congress was not their representative party and that they needed 
Pakistan only after they experienced the Congress ministries. Verifying this notion, Khaliquzzaman, 
leader of UPML, noted that Pakistan had been forced on the Muslims by the Congress as a result of 
the atrocities that had been committed upon them during its government in 1937–39 (1, p440).  
As in NWFP Dr. Khan Sahib and his associate Muslims were main leaders of Congress, it could 
gain the Muslim votes because the Muslims of the Frontier had a little idea of the meaning of Hindu 
rule under Congress Governments, which their less fortunate brothers in the Hindu-majority 
Provinces undoubtedly experienced (11 p168). 
6 
 
While Muslim League exploited the performance of Congress Ministries and other anti-League 
governments, but it did not target British raj, Congress, in its election campaign, made British raj 
the main target of their attack (12, p132). This was the use of retrospective model in the case of 
Congress.  
As World War II (1939-1945) was one of the main reasons of early elections wartime socio-
economic grievances could be exploited in election campaign to win ballots by laying responsibility 
on existing or previous provincial governments of mismanagement in handling the war-effects.  
Bengal and Punjab were the provinces where war had affected the most. In Bengal burden of war 
was multiplied by natural disasters like cyclone of 1942and disease. Denial policies owing to 
danger of Japanese advance to India, air strikes on Calucutta in December 1942, price chaos due to 
policy failures, and shortage of cloth owing to its use for military purposes were major causes of 
famine in Bengal that was by nature a ‘man-made disaster’.  
In Punjab a famine like situation had erupted by December 1945. The grain virtually disappeared 
from the open market. Even when various towns in Punjab experienced famine, some large 
landlords of the West Punjab were able to bring part of their grain to market but in East Punjab the 
situation was worse, and the Unionist Government had to requisition grain from the villages. 
Exactly in the middle of elections the disturbances broke out in Ludhiana, Hoshiarpur and Ferozpur 
districts owing to the grain requisitioning. This was unfortunate for the Unionists’ elections. The 
Muslim League exploited this and wartime economic discontent (13, p74). 
Ruling Unionist Party of Punjab, main opponent of Muslim League in that province, had to bear the 





The popularity of Unionist Government that Sikander Hayat’s successor, Khizr Hayat Khan 
Tiwana, inherited was undermined (14, p297). To allure the voters the Muslim League made 
extensive use of economic grievances that had developed during World War II, including rationing, 
shortages, bureaucratic high-handedness, and a government food policy that controlled prices that 
rural producers could get for their grain. The grievances of soldiers demobilized in 1945 also 
provided the League with arguments. These were used especially in Punjab to mobilize the 
opposition to the Unionists and the performance of Unionist Ministry that had been in power 
throughout the war (7, p.420). 
Muslim League exploited the wartime economic grievances. League propagandists took medical 
supplies, which had become increasingly expensive and difficult to obtain during the war, with 
them to the villages. They also distributed cloth there and endeavored to obtain increased ration 
allowances for the villagers. Wherever possible they gained control of the rationing machinery. 
They enjoined Pakistan to the peasants not only as a religious imperative but as a panacea for their 
social and economic problems. Propagandists were directed when they visited a village to: 'Find out 
its social problems and difficulties to tell them [i.e. the villagers] that the main cause of their 
problems was the Unionists [and] give them the solution—Pakistan'. The League workers attempted 
to win support by solving the economic problems of the villagers (13, pp74-75). 
As soon as the war ended the trials of treason against Indian National Army (I.N.A.) officers 
started. In November 1945, the public in Calcutta started to demand the release of the three on trial - 
Shah Nawaz, Dhilbn and Sehgal. On November 21, during a protest march of students a score were 
killed by police fire. In February 1946 again the unrest in the country started when trial of Captain 
Rashid Ali of the I.N.A. started (15, p198). Military firing over the protesters’ meetings erupted the 
protest all over Bengal. On 13 and 14 February complete strike was observed in Bengal and huge 
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Hindu-Muslim united rallies were held. Muhammad All Jinnah commented on the trial that it was 
“legally wrong, logically untenable and morally indefensible” (16). 
The UP Muslim League also tried to cash in on the wave of sympathy for the Muslim heroes of the 
Indian National Army (INA) who were on trial for treason by forming a committee of lawyers for 
defending them in court (1, pp.443-44). 
Muslim ministries in Bengal predictably and deliberately, sought to pull down the props and pillars 
of Hindu privilege in Bengal (17, p.12). Not only religious question but difference on political, 
economic and social interests had created bitterness among Hindus and Muslims.  
The Muslim ministry in Bengal was problematic for majority Hindus in Calcutta. League itself had 
to face the criticism on its performance during WWI. In Bengal League ministries during the war 
were condemned as the stronghold of the British. Nationalist Muslims laid the responsibility of the 
famine of 1943 on the bad performance of League ministry. To avoid the bad effects of this 
allegation Muslim League noted that Hindu majority members of the Viceroy’s executive council 
refused to send food to Bangal and instead of Benagl ministry they were responsible for famine 
(31). 
The rebuttal of various allegations leveled in the pamphlets of Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani was 
also the part of League’s election rhetoric. On the allegation of responsibility of Bengal famine on 
League Ministry there Khaliq waived off the blame from provincial ministry alone since Sir J. P. 
Srivastava, Hindu Mahasabha leader and Food Minister at the federal level also shared this 
responsibility.  
Khaliq also pointed out that the Woodhead Commission set up to enquire into the matter too had 
not been able to pin any responsibility on League ministry. Besides, even if these charges were true, 
Khaliq insisted that it was hardly fair to punish the whole party for the actions of a few individuals. 
Another charge regarding un-Islamic nature of the state of Pakistan Khaliq argued that it would be 
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Islamic as he also had read Holy Quran. (1, p444) Not to mention of the impact of these allegations 
on the result of elections they formed major part of the electoral rhetoric of the parties in elections. 
Official Interference. 
Government of India relaxed its bans on public meetings in view of securing the best possible 
atmosphere for the elections and making them as free as possible. In July 1945, bans on holding of 
meetings or processions were in force in the province of Bombay and in parts of the provinces of 
Madras, Punjab, Bihar, UP, CP, Assam and Delhi.  
In October 1945, bans of holding of meetings and processions without prior approval of local 
officer were in force in towns of Calcutta and Dacca, and in subdivision of Asansol and district of 
Minapore. On October 12, 1945 Central Government advised the provinces not to apply bans under 
Defence of India Rules to meetings and processions connected with elections.  
Bengal government issued orders for greatest possible freedom to be given to hold election 
meetings or processions. Punjab Government decided to maintain existing bans on procession in 
towns, municipalities, cantonments and other populous areas as political leaders were said to be 
satisfied with the position. Bihar Government while removing general bans considered it essential 
to retain power under Defence of India Rule 56 to require prior notice of meetings to be given. 
Remaining provinces did not object to suggested policy. Temporary bans were imposed under 
ordinary law in certain areas for specific reasons such as disturbances in connection with Indian 
National Army in provinces of Madras and UP and communal trouble in Bengal (18). 
Except the ban on ‘terrorist’ associations like RashtriyaSeak Dal, Hisdustan red army and Santi 
Senas (19) there was ban on only semi political party, the Congress Socialist Party. This party, 
according to the Viceroy, would not affect the election in any way as persons belonging to that 
party ordinarily stood as Congressmen, but in fact were an organization within Congress. The ban 
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exited in the Punjab, UP and Bihar, under the Criminal Law Amendment Act and not under wartime 
legislation or ordinance. Despite concerns of several governors at the deterioration of the law and 
order position due to violent speeches of Congress leaders, the Viceroy, was anxious, to avoid 
repressive action as long as he could. The Viceroy wanted to continue the remaining bans, but he 
was willing that members of Congress Socialist Party would not be prevented from standing for the 
election in the Congress interest (20). 
The number of political prisoners in India decreased owing to elections. In the session of the All-
India Congress Committee in 1945, it was told that the number of political prisoners detained in 
jails without trial was in thousands (21). 
In answer to a question in the British Parliament about the desirability of releasing political 
detainees in India, the Under Secretary of State for India told that the number of political detainees 
in August 1945 stood at nearly 2000 that steadily reduced to a figure of 279 on the first of March 
1946 (22). This figure of prisoners without trial was officially reported 621 on 15 December 
1945(23). Applications for removal of disqualification form candidates for Central legislature who 
were convicted of political offences were allowed except only one where disqualification was on 
account of corrupt practices. General policy followed for both Central and Provincial legislatures 
was that disqualifications were removed on application where offenders did not involve violence 
(24). 
The correspondence of viceroy and other government dignitaries verifies the charges of official 
intervention. “There have been”, Viceroy Lord Wavell (1883-1950) reported to Secretary of State 
that “a lot of allegations against the Unionist Ministry… to the effect that they are abusing their, 




Lord Pethick Lawrence, Secretary of State for India, told Lord Wavell, the viceroy, that it was 
alleged in the Commons that the election time-table in the Punjab was so arranged that those 
included in the electoral rolls for the first time were unable to stand as candidates.  
Wavell explained that there had been a lot of allegations against the Unionist Ministry in the Punjab 
to the effect that they were abusing their position to gain advantage in the election. Wavell 
dismissed a great many of the allegations as false, and he thought that in any province where there 
was a Ministry in power such criticisms were bound to occur. He noted that there was nothing to 
show that there were any mala fides in the decision of the Punjab Government to fix the nomination 
dates before the end of the revision of the electoral rolls. He told that Punjab Government had 
replied that unless there was some overlap, they could not possibly get the elections finished in time 
to pass the budget before the end of the financial year. Wavell thought to accept the position of the 
government and he deemed that it was incorrect that Sir Firoz Khan Noon was affected due to this 
decision because he had been put up as a candidate for the landholders’ constituency (25). 
In Punjab the growing communalism of Hindu and Sikh district officials strengthened this belief. 
As did the League's own threats against its opponents and the agitations it aroused in some of the 
villages of Unionist supporters (13, p71). 
The Unionist Party relied much on the machinery of government especially in the districts where its 
traditional allies had deserted it. This gave inverse results and it made the Unionist Party unpopular 
because it thus became closely identified with the district officials, whom the villagers disliked 
because of the officials' increasing intrusion into the villagers' lives as they endeavoured to ensure 
obedience to the multitude of wartime ordinances. During the election campaign in such districts as 
Lyallpur, the Unionist Party went so far as to put pressure on the voters. It was not good policy. 
Village communities resented such treatment which did much to destroy the Unionist's surviving 
popularity (13, p72). 
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League complained about official interference in the conduct of elections to harm its candidates 
especially in the Punjab and NWFP. Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah addressed to the students of Islamia 
College, Lahore on 13 January 1946and pointed out the interference by Governor Glancy and 
Premier Khizar Hayat. Salahuddin, one candidate of League from Gujranwala reported to Jinnah in 
January that police were threatening, torturing and wrongfully detaining his supporters while openly 
canvassing for his opponent, (Raja Abdullah Khan), contravening Government Servants Conduct 
Rules and committing offences under Section 171 IPC (12, p132). 
The official interference in election activities and the use of governmental influence against 
Leaguers was alleged extensively. In Punjab, the Unionists were in power. The Chief Minister 
Khizr Hayat Tiwana had liaison with the British Governor Bertrand Glancy that was titled by 
Jinnah as Glancy-Khizr axis. Bureaucracy allegedly was used to get a verdict in favour of the 
Unionists. “The entire bureaucracy – Hindu, Muslim, Sikh and the British – was against us”, 
recalled Daulatana years later (25, p5). 
On 3 December 1945, the League Working Committee eventually decided to approach the Punjab 
Governor and Viceroy to report the officers’ interference. On 8 December, the League deputation 
met the Governor and demanded enquiry by the British MPs and demanded “parliamentary 
supervision over the elections” (30). Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, a League leader of Punjab, issued a 
statement that the Deputy Commissioners and Superintendents of Police were struggling hard 
through different inducements and threats to secure the candidates for the Unionist Party against the 
Leaguers. He further said that they had appealed to the Governor to issue orders for the impartial 
working of the district administration but Glancy turned down the request (26, p216). 
Jinnah more than once had to take cognizance of the gravity of Punjab government’s interference. 
“voters and … workers… are being coerced, threatened, intimidated and persecuted”, he charged. 
And since both the Viceroy and the Governor had turned a “deaf ear” to all “shameful and criminal 
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tactics”, he told his beleaguered followers that there was “no door” to knock at and no alternative 
left but “to fight” to the bitter end (25, p.6). He again in his speech to the Muslim women on 17 
January 1946 said that the bureaucracy was interfering with the elections (28). He consoled his 
followers by saying that if Gandhi, Patel and Nehru could not damage the League what the 
Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners, and Tehsildars of the Punjab could do; they could do 
nothing to damage the prestige of the League. He considered the nationalist Muslims, Ahrars and 
Khaksars as henchmen of the government (29, pp114-19). 
Baba Kharak Singh and Gopal Singh Qaumire marked on the interference of Punjab Governor that 
SardarUjjal Singh and Baldev Singh were his ‘nominees’. The use of print media to project the 
government activities promoted the image of those candidates who were part of Unionist 
government. The Punjab government planned to project their services and activities through the 
print media. The Paisa Akhbar (Lahore) published a news story citing some prominent Indian 
newspapers that the Punjab government had purchased the local newspapers including Hindu, Ajit, 
Inqelab, Ihsan and Al-Shehbaz for its political propaganda. The government had been granting Rs. 
3,000 annually to these papers in the name of war propaganda and this amount was raised to Rs. 
17,000 till February 1945 (26, p.211). 
While mentioning a few, Sandhu (26) has pointed out numerous cases from different constituencies 
that were reported to the League leadership regarding bureaucratic and official interference. Sandhu 
quotes report that Chaudhry Ram Singh, Superintendent of Police district Shahpur, toured the area 
of Midh Ranjha, and tried to pressurize the local eminent people and supporters of the League’s 
candidate to side with Unionist candidate. In Bhalwal Tehsil, Sheikh Manzur Ali, Revenue 
Assistant and District Election Officer, tried to influence the voters against the League. The League 
meetings were held to deal with the complaints of official interference (26, p215). 
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Premier Khizr Tiwana, Ch. Chhotu Ram, Governor Glancy and the Ministers along with the officers 
openly collected funds for Unionist Party. The senior British officers sometimes supported the 
undemocratic and illegal activities of the Unionists who pressurized the subordinates to do all to 
defeat the League.  
The Punjab Premier disclosed about the Governor’s interference in the canvassing. According to 
DC, Ludhiana, he conveyed his message that Sardar Shaukat Hayat in particular and the Leaguers 
in general should not win the elections at any cost. The pro-League newspapers were dead certain 
that if the official machinery had not been used on the side of Unionists no member would have 
been returned on the Unionist ticket (26, p.216).In Bengal Muslim League, the victim of official 
interference in Punjab, was target of allegations of interference. Here Congress blamed the League 
of official interference and corruption. The Congress President Moulana Azad alleged that election 
was “sordid story of corruption and official interference of the worst type” (27). 
CONCLUSIONS. 
The interference of the existing and official governments affected on the outcomes of the elections. 
The election results were not completely free of the impact of the governments. The retrospective 
affect is not only one of major issues of the campaign in elections but also important factor in the 
decision of voting for or against a political party.  
War and famine along with their effects were not only major motives of holding the elections but 
also provided new direction to the outcomes of the elections as they became major part of electoral 
campaign.  
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